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Abstract 
 Chess experts store domain-specific representations in their long-term 
memory; due to the activation of such representations, they perform with high 
accuracy in tasks that require the maintenance of previously seen information. Chunk-
based theories of expertise (chunking theory: Chase & Simon, 1973; template theory: 
Gobet & Simon, 1996) state that expertise is acquired mainly by the acquisition and 
storage in long-term memory of familiar chunks that allow quick recognition. We 
tested some predictions of these theories by using fMRI while chessplayers performed 
a recognition memory task. These theories predict that chessplayers access long-term 
memory chunks of domain-specific information, which are presumably stored in the 
temporal lobes. We also predicted that the recognition memory tasks would activate 
working memory areas in the frontal and parietal lobes. These predictions were 
supported by the data.  
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Brain Localisation of Memory Chunks in Chessplayers 
 Chase and Simon’s (1973) seminal study of cognitive processes in 
chessplayers has had a strong impact in cognitive psychology. Their research spawned 
several studies in which chess was used successfully as a research tool for studying 
cognitive processes such as perception, memory and decision making (see Charness, 
1992; Gobet, De Voogt, & Retschitzki, 2004, and Saariluoma, 1995 for reviews).  
 One of the paradigmatic results obtained in this line of research is that chess 
experts are able to reconstruct with high accuracy a game position that had been 
shown for only a few seconds (Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 2000). 
However, when the pieces are randomly placed throughout the board, experts perform 
only slightly better than novices (Gobet & Simon, 2000). Chunk-based theories of 
expertise (chunking theory: Chase & Simon, 1973; template theory: Gobet & Simon, 
1996) account for these results by proposing that, during study and practice, experts 
store domain-specific “chunks” (perceptual patterns that can be used as units of 
meaning) in their long-term memory. When this practice becomes serious and 
continuous, some of the chunks evolve into more complex structures called 
“templates,” consisting of core information supplemented with slots in which more 
information (perceptual or abstract) can be added (Gobet & Simon, 1996). Evidence 
for chunks and templates stored in long-term memory as the building blocks of chess 
expertise originates from behavioural studies (Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 
1996) and computational simulations (Gobet & Simon, 2000). Chunk-based theories 
of expertise are generalizable to other domains of expertise such as computer 
programming, medical diagnosis and engineering (Gobet et al., 20001; Simon & 
Gobet, 2000). 
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  Since chess has proven to be successful as a research tool to study cognitive 
processes, it is surprising that only a handful of studies have been done in cognitive 
neuroimaging with this game. Nichelli et al. (1994) asked chessplayers to perform 
simple chess tasks while brain activity was monitored with a PET scanner; Onofrj 
(1995) performed a SPECT study in which they asked players to solve a chess 
problem; Amizdic, Riehle, Fehr, Wienbruch and Elbert (2001) asked participants, 
ranging from strong grandmasters to class B players (see Methods for an explanation 
of chess skill levels), to play a game against a computer while they were scanned 
using a gamma burst technique; and Atherton, Zhuang, Bart, Hu and Sheng (2003) 
carried out an fMRI study in which players had to solve a chess problem. The results 
of these studies suggest that, when players had to solve a problem or play a game, 
they activated frontal and parietal areas. Finally, Campitelli, Gobet and Parker (2005) 
used fMRI in order to compare chessplayers with non-chessplayers in a memory task 
using chess positions and displays made of geometrical shapes. 
 In the present study, we used chess as a tool to investigate the neural 
substrates of working and long-term memory, and, more specifically, the localisation 
of domain-specific chunks in long-term memory. We did this by performing two 
types of comparisons. First, we compared the brain activity of chessplayers 
performing a recognition memory task with chess stimuli to that of the same players 
performing a similar task with unfamiliar non-chess stimuli (in order to identify long-
term domain-specific chunks). Second, we compared the brain activity of players 
performing a recognition memory task with chess stimuli to that of the same players 
performing a perceptual-motor control task with the same chess stimuli (in order to 
identify brain activity related to working memory). It is well established (Britton & 
Tesser, 1982; Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998) that chessplayers automatically 
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activate chunks in long-term memory when perceiving familiar positions. Therefore, 
the added value of using chessplayers to study memory is that we can be confident 
that the players are using their long-term memory chunks, whereas in normal studies 
the use of long-term memory or working memory is assumed by the researcher as a 
function of the task used. For example, chessplayers can perform a so-called “working 
memory task” such as a delayed-match-to-sample task and a so-called “long-term 
memory task” such as a recall task, and in both they would access chunks that have 
been stored for a long time (i.e., long-term memory chunks). This is well established 
because their performance diminishes when non-domain-specific stimuli are used, 
regardless of the task. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the 
brain localisation of long-term memory chunks in experts. 
 Previous studies both in cognitive neuroimaging in humans and single-cell 
recording in non-human primates have investigated the brain areas involved in 
working memory and long-term memory. There is evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that the ventral areas of the temporal lobe (fusiform gyrus and parahippocampal 
gyrus) are involved in the storage of familiar patterns in long-term memory 
(Desimone, Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984; Gross, 1992; Logothetis, Pauls & 
Poggio, 1995; Stark & Squire, 2000; Tanaka, 1993) whilst substantial evidence 
supports the role of the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes in working 
memory (Fuster, 1998, 2000; Goldman-Rakic, 1998). (But see Cabeza & Nyberg, 
2000, for studies relating the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes to other 
memory processes, including episodic memory processes such as storage and 
retrieval.) 
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 We submitted 5 skilled chessplayers to a recognition memory task while brain 
images were obtained using fMRI.1 We hypothesized that players would access their 
long-term memory chunks automatically when chess stimuli were presented, and that 
this would activate long-term memory areas in the fusiform gyrus and 
parahippocampal gyrus. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Five right-handed healthy chessplayers with normal vision participated in the 
experiment. Informed consent was obtained from each subject. The mean age of the 
participants was 24.6 years (sd = 8.0). The players were recruited from 
Nottinghamshire chess clubs and from the University of Nottingham chess club.  The 
mean in Elo rating points (Elo, 1978) was 1971 (range 1750-2200). The Elo system 
rates chessplayers from intermediate to world-champion level. Players with more than 
2200 points are considered masters; players between 2000 and 2200 are classified as 
candidate masters; players between 1800 and 2000 are considered class A level 
players; chessplayers between 1600 and 1800 are considered class B level players, 
etc. The World Chess Federation awards players with titles; usually players with more 
than 2400 are international masters and players with more than 2500 are 
grandmasters.  
 Originally, seven players took part in the experiment; the data of two of the 
players were discarded because of failure to fulfil the motion criterion (see below). 
Ethical approval was obtained from the School of Psychology, University of 
                                                 
1
  We did not include a control group made of non-chess players, as their 
lack of knowledge of the game implies that they do not have chess chunks, 
which would make comparisons with chess players difficult to interpret. 
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Nottingham ethics committee. Regulations of the Sir Peter Mansfield Magnetic 
Resonance Centre, University of Nottingham, were followed. 
Task and stimuli 
 All the blocks of all the conditions had the same structure (see Figure 1). Each 
block started with a fixation cross which remained on screen for 12.5 s. Following the 
fixation cross, a sample stimulus was presented for 6.5 s. After a 2-s delay, a series of 
7 test stimuli of the same type appeared sequentially (i.e., if the sample stimulus was a 
scene, all the test stimuli were scenes). Each of the seven test stimuli was presented 
for 3 s with an inter-stimulus interval of 1 s. The task consisted of deciding whether 
the test stimuli matched the sample stimulus or not, by pressing the left and right 
buttons, respectively. The participants had to respond within the 3 seconds during 
which the test stimuli were on the screen.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 There were 4 conditions: game, random, scene and dot (see Figure 2). In the 
first three conditions, the task was the one explained above, the only difference 
between the conditions being the type of stimuli. The dot condition was a perceptual-
motor control for the game condition. In the dot condition the block structure was the 
same as that of the other conditions, but the task was different. The sample stimulus 
consisted of a chess position with a black dot in one of the middle squares of the 
board. The test stimuli were also chess positions; some of them had a black dot and 
some others did not. The task consisted of pressing the left button of the button box if 
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there was a black dot and the right button if there was no black dot. Note that we 
deliberately chose simple tasks so that the conditions are of similar difficulty. 
 In the game and dot conditions, the stimuli were the right half of a grey-scale 
chessboard (4 x 8 squares) with black and white chess pieces forming a pattern 
resembling that of a game position. Half boards, instead of full boards, were used in 
order to restrict the number of eye movements. Saariluoma (1994) has shown that 
players can recognize chunks within a quadrant of the board even when the location 
of the pieces on the adjacent quadrants has been randomised; thus, it is unlikely that 
the use of half boards negatively affected the access to LTM chunks. In the random 
condition, the pieces were haphazardly distributed throughout the board. All the 
positions in these conditions contained 16 pieces (8 ± 1 white and 8 ± 1 black). In the 
scene condition, the stimuli were a grey-scale background with ellipses and different 
types of black and white shapes (2 triangles, 2 squares, 2 rhombuses, and 2 circles). 
 Forty-four blocks (11 blocks of each condition) were pseudo-randomly 
presented. The number of test stimuli matching the sample within each block varied 
from 2 to 4, with an average of 3. The test stimuli that did not match the sample had 
the same number of pieces (or shapes) as the sample stimulus, the only difference 
being their location. Twelve stimuli were used for each condition, each taking the role 
of sample stimulus only once. The chess positions consisted of middle game positions 
with familiar configurations of pieces. 
fMRI imaging parameters and analyses 
 The experiment was carried out in a 3-Tesla scanner with a TEM Nova 
medical head-coil at the University of Nottingham Sir Peter Mansfield Magnetic 
Resonance Centre. The stimuli had a vertical visual angle of 16º and a horizontal 
visual angle of 8º. Participants wore prism glasses in order to see the stimuli. 
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 Images of the whole brain were obtained. Twenty-two coronal slices were 
obtained at a rate of 136 ms each, hence the TR was 2,992 ms. The images were T2* 
weighted Echo-Planar images (EPIs). The size of the images was 64 x 64 voxels. The 
voxel size was 3 mm x 3 mm in-plane, and the slice thickness was 9 mm. The 
experimental paradigm started 12 s after the scanner started recording, in order to 
allow for magnetic saturation effects. The 4 volumes obtained during these 12 s were 
discarded. 
 The processing of the data was carried out with Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM99) developed by Friston et al. (1995). The software Talairach Daemon 
(Lancaster, Summerln, Rainey, Freitas, & Fox, 1997) was used to obtain Brodmann 
areas given Talairach coordinates as input. Realignment, spatial normalization and 
spatial smoothing were performed in SPM99. The data from subjects who translated 
their heads more than 5 mm in any direction or rotated their heads more than 5º in any 
of the axes were discarded from further analysis. For the spatial smoothing, an 8 mm 
x 8 mm x 8 mm Gaussian kernel was utilized. A high-pass temporal filter of 131 s. 
was used and the hemodynamic response function was chosen as a low-pass temporal 
filter. Since the accuracy rate was above 90% we used all the epochs for the analysis. 
 We performed a fixed-effects analysis. A box-car function convolved with a 
hemodynamic response function was used to model the data. Three contrasts were 
planned: game > dot, game > scene and game > random. SPM maps of t values were 
obtained after correction for multiple comparisons, showing p < .05. Only the clusters 
of more than 5 voxels were reported. 
 Game was the key condition, and the other three conditions controlled for 
different aspects of the task in the game condition. In the principal task, participants 
were supposed to perceive the stimulus; recognise it as a chess pattern; encode it; 
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maintain a representation of it in memory during the delay and during the presentation 
of the test stimuli; match the test stimuli to this representation; decide whether they 
are the same or not; and finally press a button. In the dot condition, participants were 
required to carry out only the perceptual and motor aspects of the task explained 
above; therefore, the subtraction game > dot captures the working-memory 
components of the task. In the scene condition, participants were required to carry out 
the same processes as in the game condition, but the type of stimuli differed. The 
subtraction of brain activity in the scene condition from that in the game condition 
would show the brain activity due to access to long-term memory areas. The random 
condition included the same type of task and stimuli as the game condition, but the 
meaningfulness and the typicality of the stimuli varied. Thus, the contrast game > 
random afforded us the possibility of investigating the brain location of familiar 
perceptual patterns. Because we had specific theoretical predictions, we limited the 
analysis to uni-directional contrasts; this also had the advantage of keeping the 
number of comparisons reasonably low. 
Results 
Behavioural data 
The players performed very accurately (above 90% correct). The mean 
percentage correct and standard error (±) were: 97.1 ± 2.6. The mean percentage 
correct and the standard error for the four conditions were the following: game, 94.4 ± 
1.3; random, 98.4 ± 0.8; scene, 97.6 ± 0.8; and dot, 98.2 ± 0.9. We carried out a one-
way ANOVA for related samples and there was a significant effect (F(3,12) = 4.25; p 
< .05). The only significant post-hoc difference was that between game and random.   
The overall mean reaction time (in milliseconds) and standard error were the 
following: 1164 ± 40. The mean reaction time and standard error for the four 
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conditions were the following: game, 1274 ± 80; random, 1202 ± 77; scene, 1149 ± 
69; and dot, 1031 ± 75. A one-way ANOVA for related samples showed a significant 
effect (F(3,12) = 12.1; p < .001). The post-hoc comparisons indicated that players 
were faster in the dot condition than in both the game and random conditions, and that 
they were slower in the game condition than in the scene condition. 
The effect of condition in accuracy, although significant, is quite small (a 
difference of only 4% between the game and random conditions). However, the 
differences in reaction time were considerable. It is not surprising that the dot 
condition was performed faster because it was computationally simpler than the other 
conditions. The difference between the game and scene conditions may be explained 
by the fact that players may automatically think of moves in the chess positions, 
moves that are not relevant for the task at hand, which may have slowed down the 
response.  In support for this hypothesis, De Groot and Gobet (1996) report that, in a 
memory recall task, players often mentioned possible moves and plans, although the 
task was specifically presented as a memory task. In addition, Britton and Tesser 
(1982) have shown that engagemenf of chess knowledge slows down performance in 
a simultaneous reaction task. 
Brain imaging data 
 Statistical parametrical maps were obtained of the contrasts game > dot, game 
> scene, and game > random. The first contrast assessed differences in working 
memory processes and the last two contrasts showed the activations due to different 
aspects of long-term memory. 
Contrast game > dot: Working Memory. 
 The contrast game > dot (see Figure 3 and Table 1) reveals the brain activity 
due to the working-memory aspects of the game condition. A strong prediction of 
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chunk-based theories for this contrast is that it would activate working memory areas 
(i.e., dorso-lateral prefrontal and parietal areas) but not temporal areas. The access to 
domain-specific long-term memory patterns in the temporal lobe would occur in the 
game but also in the dot condition, due to the automatic character of pattern 
recognition (Britton & Tesser, 1982; Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998); therefore, 
no activation should be found in the temporal lobe. However, the game condition 
requires the maintenance of the sample stimulus that would cause the activation of 
working-memory areas. The results support this prediction by showing the main 
activation in the dorso-lateral prefrontal and parietal lobes and little activation in the 
temporal lobes.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 There were 576 voxels activated in the players. Activations were found in 
BA37 (left occipital and bilateral temporal fusiform gyri), BA19 (bilateral superior 
occipital gyri), and BA7 (right superior parietal lobule and precunei). In the prefrontal 
lobes the activations were in BA46 (left middle frontal gyrus), BA45 (right middle 
frontal gyrus) and BA9 (inferior frontal gyrus). (In all cases, p < .05 with correction 
for multiple comparisons.)  
Contrast game > scene: Long-term memory. 
 The contrast game > scene (see Table 2 and Figure 4) reveals the activations 
due to chess-specific features (i.e., chess pieces and board, and typical patterns of 
pieces). Chunk-based theories predict activation in areas that store long-term memory 
patterns (i.e., fusiform gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus) in chessplayers (because the 
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representations of the typical chess configurations will be activated) but not in 
working-memory areas (because in both conditions working-memory areas would be 
activated). Following our prediction, players showed activity in temporal lobe areas 
including the fusiform gyrus, the parahippocampal gyrus, and inferior temporal gyrus. 
On the other hand, they also showed unexpected activations in the precunei, the 
posterior cingulate, and the supramarginal gyrus. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE  2 ABOUT HERE 
Contrast game > random: Long-term memory. 
 In the contrast game > random, chunk-based theories predict activity in areas 
that store long-term memory patterns (hence, in fusiform and parahippocampal gyri), 
but to a lesser extent than the contrast game > scene. This is because in the present 
contrast, only the typicality of the positions differs between conditions. We found 
activation only in BA37 (left parahippocampal gyrus, -28 -44 -7, t = 5.31). 
Discussion 
We investigated the neural substrates of working and long-term memory in a 
recognition memory task with chessplayers. The rationale of our study was that, given 
that chessplayers possess domain-specific chunks stored in long-term memory, the 
comparison of brain activity between a condition with chess stimuli and another 
condition with non-chess stimuli (but the same task), would be in the area where these 
chunks are stored. Following chunk-based theories of expertise and previous 
neuroscientific literature, we proposed that chessplayers would activate long-term 
memory chunks in the temporal lobe (i.e., fusiform and parahippocampal gyri) when 
presented with chess stimuli. Moreover, following the literature showing the 
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engagement of the dorso-lateral prefrontal and parietal lobes in working memory 
tasks, we expected activation in those areas in the conditions with a memory task. In 
terms of the contrasts of interest, we predicted brain activity in the fusiform and 
parahippocampal gyri in the game > scene contrast and in the game > random contrast 
(though, to a lesser degree in the latter), as well as activity in the dorso-lateral 
prefrontal, ventro-lateral prefrontal and parietal (but not temporal) lobes in the game > 
dot contrast. 
The results supported our hypotheses. The game > dot contrast showed brain 
activity in the dorso-lateral prefrontal and parietal lobes and very little activation in 
the temporal lobes. Furthermore, the game > scene contrast showed activation in the 
temporal lobe and the game > random contrast showed a small cluster of brain 
activity in the temporal lobe. However, some results were not expected. First, given 
the large differences in performance found in memory recall tasks between the game 
and random conditions (e.g., Gobet & Simon, 2000), we expected more activation in 
the game > random contrast.  However, we have to remember that the differences in 
performance between the game and random conditions were typically observed in 
recall tasks, whereas our experiment used a recognition task. In fact, previous 
experiments have shown that differences are much smaller in recognition tasks, 
Saariluoma (1984) finding a difference of 10% in favour of game positions and 
Goldin (1979) even finding a 2% advantage with random positions. Moreover, it is 
well known from the literature on verbal memory that, in recognition tasks, better 
performance is obtained with atypical words than with typical words (Kintsch, 1970). 
A natural continuation of our study would be to use the traditional recall task, 
although this may be difficult in a brain-imaging setting due to the necessity of 
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moving the computer mouse for placing pieces on the board, which requires 
numerous finger and hand movements. 
Second, in the game > scene contrast, we found unexpected bilateral activation 
in the precunei and posterior cingulate, as well as activation in the right supramarginal 
gyrus. We suggest the following explanation. It is well known that there exist two 
visual pathways in the cortex: both start in the occipital lobe and then divide in the 
“where” dorsal pathway in the parietal lobe and the “what” ventral pathway in the 
temporal lobe (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). We hypothesize that all conditions 
activated these pathways because of the visual nature of the task, and that they also 
activated motor areas due to the necessary motor response. Since all these areas were 
common  for all the conditions, no activity was expected in these areas in the 
contrasts. We also hypothesize that in the game and the random conditions the 
activation of domain-specific long-term memory chunks in the temporal lobes was 
followed by the activation of the working memory areas of the dorso-lateral prefrontal 
and parietal lobes that, in turn, generated a feedback activation to the temporal lobes. 
This is similar to a proposal by Fuster (1998, 2000), who explained working memory 
by the feedback activation from the prefrontal lobes to the temporal lobes. This would 
allow a link to be generated between the domain-specific chunks already stored in 
long-term memory and the information held in working memory. On the other hand, 
we hypothesize that in the scene condition players activated the long-term memory 
patterns related to geometrical figures but they did not need to make a link between 
these patterns and areas involved in working memory; hence, the feedback 
mechanism just described did not take place in this case. This explanation accounts 
for the activation of parietal areas in the game > scene contrast, because in the game 
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condition (but not in the scene condition) the parietal areas generated a feedback 
activation to the temporal lobe. 
In the present study, the network of areas recruited by chessplayers included 
dorso-lateral prefrontal areas BA46 (left middle frontal gyrus), and a cluster of 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal areas containing BA45 and BA9 (right 
middle and inferior frontal gyri). In a review of brain imaging studies (Cabeza & 
Nyberg, 2000), BA9 was shown to be bilaterally involved in all types of working 
memory and in sustained attention in the right hemisphere, and BA46 was also 
bilaterally recruited by all kinds of working memory tasks, with emphasis on spatial 
working memory. Moreover, prefrontal areas were also involved in planning and 
executive control (Newman, Carpenter, Varma, & Just, 2003; Smith & Jonides, 
1999). The pattern of activation seen in posterior areas includes a cluster in the right 
hemisphere in BA7 (superior parietal lobule and precuneus) and another in BA19 
(superior occipital gyrus) emerged. The same was found in the left hemisphere. BA19 
has been involved bilaterally in spatial working memory and problem solving tasks 
(Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). Brodmann area 7 (especially the precuneus) has been 
shown to be involved in visual imagery (Andreasen et al., 1995) and matching targets 
to templates (Herath, Kinomura, & Roland, 2001). A number of voxels within BA37 
were also active bilaterally: left occipital and temporal fusiform gyrus, and right 
temporal fusiform gyrus. The fusiform gyrus has been shown to be activated by the 
presentation of faces (Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998), and its activation 
increases with expertise (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, 
Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000). Finally, 
supramarginal gyrus (BA39) activation was found in autobiographical memory 
 17
experiments (see Levine, 2004, for a review), and it has been suggested that this 
activation should reflect the imaging of movements (Levine, 2004). 
 We now analyze the relationship between our results and previous 
neuroimaging studies using chessplayers. In Amizdic et al.'s (2001) study, players 
ranging from intermediate players to grandmasters played a chess game against a 
computer while brain activity was measured. The strong players showed more 
activation in parietal and frontal areas relative to activation in medial temporal 
structures (i.e., perirhinal, entorhinal cortex and hippocampus). The intermediate 
players showed an equally distributed pattern of activation in the same areas. Our 
results also showed activation of frontal, parietal and temporal areas. Since the players 
who participated in our study are comparable with the average intermediate players in 
Amizdic et al.’s (2001) study, our results are consistent with theirs. 
 Onofrj et al.'s (1995) study found middle temporal and frontal activation in a 
problem solving and imagery task. The pattern of activation was similar to our study 
with the difference that Onofrj et al. did not find activity in the parietal lobe. As the 
authors pointed out, the fact that no parietal activation was observed was surprising 
due to the imagery nature of the task. One possible explanation is that they used a 
well-known chess position that may have been familiar to some of the players.  
Hence, finding the winning combination required more activation of LTM knowledge 
than online maintenance of information. Nichelli et al.'s (1994) study is in accord with 
our results in the activations found in lateral and medial parts of the occipital and 
parietal cortices, and also in inferior, lateral and medial parts of the left temporal lobe. 
Nichelli et al.’s tasks addressed colour and spatial discrimination, rule retrieval, and 
checkmate judgement. 
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 Atherton et al. (2003) studied chess novices. They found a pattern of 
activation of parietal and prefrontal areas when they subtracted the brain activity due 
to a simple counting task from the brain activity due to a problem-solving task. 
Consistent with our explanation, when required, chessplayers use their working 
memory; therefore, activity in prefrontal and parietal areas is expected. Atherton et al. 
(2003) also investigated a hypothesis put forward by Cranberg and Albert (1988), 
according to which the visuospatial nature of chess suggests that it should 
predominantly engage the right hemisphere. However, Atherton et al. (2003) did not 
find any lateralization. Visual inspection of Figures 3 and 4 show that there was no 
lateralization in the game > dot contrast, and only a marginal right lateralization in the 
game > scene contrast; moreover, the game > random contrast showed a small area 
activated in the left hemisphere. Therefore, consistent with Atherton et al.’s (2003) 
study, our results do not support Cranberg and Albert’s (1988) hypothesis. 
 Atherton et al. (2003) also investigated whether the general intelligence area 
(i.e., BA 45) identified by Duncan et al. (2000) was activated in their participants. 
They did not find activation in this area and, therefore, concluded that chess is a 
visuo-spatial task and not one that requires general abilities. Although we did find 
activation in BA45, we also think that chess is mainly a visuo-spatial ability. Indeed, 
Gobet, Campitelli and Waters (2003) showed that the link between chess and general 
intelligence is not clear-cut. In general, Duncan et al.’s (2000) claim that BA45 is the 
seat of general intelligence is difficult to reconcile with previous literature showing 
brain activity in this area in tasks that are not specifically engaging general 
intelligence (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). Campitelli, Parker and Gobet (2005) found 
that non-chessplayers activated more frontal areas when they performed a memory 
task with chess stimuli than when they performed a memory task in which the chess 
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symbols were changed by geometric figures. By contrast, chessplayers did not show 
any differences.  
 In conclusion, our study aimed to find the brain localisation of experts’ 
memory chunks. We compared chessplayers’ brain activity using chess stimuli and 
non-chess stimuli in the same task. Moreover, we investigated working memory by 
comparing players’ brain activity in a recognition memory task and a perceptual-
motor control task. We found two clear results: activation of the frontal and parietal 
areas in the contrast that reflected working memory processes, and activation of 
temporal areas (fusiform and parahippocampal gyri) in the contrast that reflected 
long-term memory chunks. In addition, we found activation in the parietal lobe in the 
latter contrast; we explained this result in terms of feedback activation from the 
parietal to the temporal lobe.   
 The use of experts as participants is an important tool in brain imaging. Not 
only does it afford the possibility to study the acquisition of expertise—which is a 
relevant psychological phenomenon per se—but it also allows researchers to 
investigate the role of memory chunks in cognition.  There is substantial evidence that 
chunking mechanisms play a key role in cognition in general, and in expertise in 
particular (Gobet et al., 2001). Understanding the biological basis of chunking is an 
important goal for neuroscience, and our study contributes to this goal by suggesting 
possible brain locations where long-term memory chunks are stored.
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Block structure.  
Each block started with a fixation cross, which was displayed for 12.5 seconds; this 
was followed by a target stimulus, which remained on the screen for 6.5 seconds. 
After a 2-second delay, a series of 7 test stimuli was presented. Each stimulus 
remained visible for 3 seconds, with an inter-stimuli delay of 1 second. On average, 3 
of the 7 test stimuli matched the target stimulus. 
 
Figure 2. Experimental conditions. 
(a) game, (b) random, (c) scene and (d) dot conditions. For the conditions (a), (b) and 
(c), after seeing a target stimulus for 6.5 seconds, the participants were presented with 
a series of 7 stimuli during 3 seconds each and had to decide whether each stimulus 
matched the target. Condition (d) was a perceptual-motor control condition, in which 
the block structure was the same as with the other conditions. Participants had to 
indicate whether there was a dot in each stimulus. There was no memory component 
in this task.   
 
Figure 3. Brain activity of the contrast game > dot: Working memory. 
The top-left image is a medial view of the left hemisphere, the top-right image is a 
medial view of the right hemisphere, the bottom-left image is a lateral view of the 
right hemisphere, and the bottom-right image is a lateral view of the left hemisphere. 
For more details of brain areas activated in this contrast, see Table 1. 
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Figure 4. Brain activity of the contrast game > scene: Long-term memory. 
The top-left image is a medial view of the left hemisphere, the top-right image is a 
medial view of the right hemisphere, the bottom-left image is a lateral view of the 
right hemisphere, and the bottom-right image is a lateral view of the left hemisphere. 
For more details of brain areas activated in this contrast, see Table 2. 
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Figure 1. Block structure 
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Figure 2. Experimental conditions. 
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Figure 3. Contrast game > dot: Working Memory. 
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Figure 4. Contrast game > scene: Long-term memory. 
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Table 1. Foci of activation of the contrast game > dot: Working memory 
Vox Hem. Brain region BA t-value Talairach 
          X y Z 
28 L Occipital fusiform gyrus 37 5.88 -33 -44 -10 
36 R Superior occipital gyrus 19 5.56 39 -74 26 
149 L Superior occipital gyrus 19 5.91 -27 -74 28 
 L Precuneus 7 5.48 -21 -71 37 
 L Precuneus 7 5.3 -12 -73 45 
243 R Superior parietal lobule 7 7.49 12 -64 56 
 R Precuneus 7 6.38 24 -68 42 
7 L Temporal fusiform gyrus 37 5.24 -47 -59 -17 
6 R Temporal fusiform gyrus 37 4.85 47 -53 -12 
107 L Middle frontal gyrus 46 6.07 -47 30 21 
115 R Middle frontal gyrus 45 6.76 53 22 26 
 R Inferior frontal gyrus 9 6.19 41 10 22 
Note. Vox.= number of voxels in the cluster reported; Hem.= Hemisphere; BA= 
Brodmann area. 
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Table 2. Foci of activation of the contrast game > scene: Long-term memory 
Vox. Hem. Brain region   BA t-value   Talairach coordinates 
              x y Z 
313 R Precuneus   7 7.4  8 -61 55 
 R Precuneus   7 6.06  6 -44 52 
 L Precuneus   7 5.66  -6 -53 52 
349 R Posterior cingulate  31 6.88  15 -48 19 
 R Posterior cingulate  30 5.99  9 -49 11 
 L Lingual gyrus  18 6.09  -12 -52 5 
7 R Temporal fusiform gyrus  37 5.14  47 -50 -13 
7 R Inferior temporal gyrus  37 4.79  50 -47 -5 
113 R Supramarginal gyrus  39 7.8  44 -75 23 
50 R Parahippocampal gyrus  36 6.92  27 -38 -6 
174 L Parahippocampal gyrus  37 10.44  -29 -44 -8 
Note. Vox.= number of voxels in the cluster reported; Hem.= Hemisphere; BA= 
Brodmann area. 
 
 
